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Attachments

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SECURITY INFORMATION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

28 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans, OIR  
Colonel Gerald F. Lillard, G-2  
Captain Ray Malpass, ONI  
Colonel Edward H. Porter, AFOIN  
Colonel S. M. Lansing, JIG

SUBJECT : NIE-61: Consequences of Communist Control  
over the Indian Subcontinent

1. The attached terms of reference, indicating the allocations of production responsibility, were agreed on by the IAC representatives meeting on 28 March.

2. It is requested that contributions be received in this office by the close of business Friday, 25 April.

  
Executive Secretary

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SECURITY INFORMATION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

28 March 1952

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: WIE-61: CONSEQUENCES OF COMMUNIST  
CONTROL OVER THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT

QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

- I. HOW ARE WESTERN CAPABILITIES AFFECTED BY THE FACT THAT THE  
INDIAN SUBCONTINENT IS NOT UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL?

Defense  
Agencies

A. Military

1. What is the present strength and combat effectiveness of the ground, air, and naval forces of the subcontinent?
2. In a military sense, to what extent does the subcontinent serve as a deterrent to Communist expansion in Southeast Asia? the Middle East?
3. In what ways and to what extent would a non-Communist subcontinent affect the military position of the West in a global conflict with the USSR if it remained non-Communist and neutral? if it remained non-Communist and joined the Western Powers?

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O/RR

B. Economic

(Contributions to NIE-56: "Likelihood of Loss of Important Economic Resources in Selected Foreign Areas," should be adequate to determine what resources the West is currently obtaining from the subcontinent, the consequences to the West of being denied these resources in time of peace or war, and those factors [short of Communist control] which might affect the ability of the US and its allies to exploit the resources of the subcontinent.)

OIR

C. Political

1. What political, ideological, or psychological advantages and disadvantages accrue to the US from the present position of the countries of the subcontinent in the East-West conflict?

II. HOW WOULD SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES BE AFFECTED IF THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT CAME UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL?\*

Defense  
Agencies

A. Military

1. What effects (as distinguished from the denial factors to the West as discussed in Section I-A)

\* It is assumed that a Communist regime has come to power and is cooperating with the USSR and Communist China. It is also assumed that the Communist regime will exploit the resources of the subcontinent or the Middle East.

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would a Communist subcontinent have on over-all Soviet bloc military capabilities?

- a. Under Communist control, how would present subcontinent military forces affect Soviet bloc capabilities for:
  - i. Offensive operations against the Middle East and the Far East?
  - ii. Interfering with Western communications?
- b. To what extent could these subcontinent capabilities be increased without materiel assistance from the Soviet bloc?
- c. To what extent would the Soviet bloc be able and likely to increase subcontinent military capabilities? Consideration should be given to such factors as:
  - i. Probable Soviet policy with regard to building a strong military power on the subcontinent.
  - ii. Present Soviet commitments.
  - iii. Availability in the Soviet bloc of the necessary technical and materiel resources?
  - iv. Problems of transportation and communications.

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OIR  
and  
ORR

B. Economic

1. To what extent would the existing economic resources of the subcontinent increase the economic war potential of the Soviet bloc?
2. Under Communist control, to what extent might the potential economic resources of the subcontinent be developed? Consideration should be given to such factors as:
  - a. Possible Soviet reluctance to create a strong Communist state which the USSR might be unable to control.
  - b. A possible curtailment or cessation of trade with the West.
  - c. Limitations on the ability of the Soviet bloc to supply the necessary economic and technical assistance.

OIR

C. Political

1. In terms of the East-West conflict, what political, ideological, or psychological advantages or disadvantages

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might accrue to the Soviet bloc, as a consequence of Communist control of the subcontinent, in:

- a. The Middle East?
- b. Southeast Asia?
- c. The non-Communist Far East?
- d. Western Europe?

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